I want to be upfront about where I'm coming from before I say anything else: I'm not an AI skeptic. I run AI agents most of my working day, and I've built plenty of them for different tasks. I use them for a lot — building internal tools, troubleshooting, you name it. Half the projects on my plate right now exist because an AI agent worked alongside me, troubleshot with me, and knocked out in a few days what would've taken months. So when I say the Hugging Face breach worried

The Problem Nobody Loves Admitting Every SOC analyst I know has a version of the same complaint. Splunk gets expensive the moment your log volume grows past whatever number your finance team quietly panicked about last renewal. Sentinel is great if your entire estate lives in Azure and painful the moment it doesn't. And half the SIEMs on the market still feel like they were built for a world where a 'query' meant clicking through six dropdown menus instead of just writing SQL

Where the traffic actually went — and why GCP's network model means one VPC can span the whole company. GCP's networking model has one structural quirk that changes how you scope an investigation compared to AWS: a VPC in Google Cloud is global, not regional, and it's also a project-level resource that can be shared across other projects entirely. Get this wrong and you'll scope an incident to a single project when the network the attacker actually moved through spans half th

Dont forget to check out completle SentinelOne series https://www.cyberengage.org/courses-1/mastering-sentinelone%3A-a-comprehensive-guide-to-deep-visibility%2C-threat-hunting%2C-and-advanced-querying%22 Introduction Ran into something during a routine SentinelOne rollout that's worth sharing, because it doesn't look like a SentinelOne problem when you first see it — it looks like the third-party app is broken. An employee's VPN client wouldn't connect on their managed Mac. I

GCS buckets are both a common source of evidence and, misconfigured, one of the most common ways data actually leaves a GCP environment. Cloud Storage shows up in almost every incident twice: once as a target — the thing the attacker was actually after — and once as a source of evidence, if you configured it right beforehand. This article covers both sides: how bucket access actually works, how to tell if an attacker exfiltrated data through a bucket, and how to collect GCS o